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essay, Jeffrey Record points out that those
who emphasize the failures of civilian
policy makers in Washington ignore both
the achievements of Vietnamese revolu-
tionaries and “the defective professional
U.S. military performance in Vietnam
within the political limitations imposed
on the use of force.” If politicians were
stabbing the military in the back, “the
military also was shooting itself in the
foot.” He concludes that it is unlikely
that the United States could have done
more than increase the price of an en-
emy victory. John Prados analyzes the
uses of intelligence by both sides, em-
phasizing the difficulties of the Ameri-
cans and South Vietnamese in
collecting accurate information, and
the extent of North Vietnamese and
Vietcong penetration of the Saigon
government and army. Gilbert chal-
lenges the views of Harry Summers,
Jr., and William E. Colby, both of
whom, he believes, fail to understand
that America in Vietnam was betrayed
“by its own collective limited vision of
the nature of the war and the require-
ments of victory.” Andrew Rotter ex-
amines the respective economic
cultures of America and North Vietnam
that shaped each side’s response to the
war, while Marilyn Young explores the
impact of the American peace movement,
suggesting that whatever its effect on the
length of the conflict, widespread protests
“increased the price to the government of
continued prosecution of the war.”
In a thoughtful reflection on these es-
says, Lloyd Gardner writes that “the re-
ality of Vietnam was as elusive to
American policymakers as the enemy
forces were to the men they sent to this
hall of mirrors. They saw only their
own reflections, multiplied over and
over.” Like policy makers at the time,
many historians have also been in a hall
of mirrors, preoccupied with the Amer-
ican side of the struggle. It is the great
strength of this volume that, at least in
part, it suggests the insights that can be
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This work compellingly describes how
Japanese naval aviation, both land and
carrier based—like that of its principal
adversary in the Pacific War, the United
States—grew to maturity through trial
and error. Its maturation period ex-
tended from the earliest days of pow-
ered flight through the bloody crucible
of war with China. The story of U.S. na-
val aviation during this time is a famil-
iar one, but that of the Japanese is less
so, due to the formidable barrier posed
by language. As more scholars equip
themselves with the tools necessary to
mine riches from the sources and publi-
cations of a former enemy, however,
the other side of the story is becoming
known. One such diligent student of
Japanese naval history is Mark R.
Peattie, familiar as the coauthor (with
David C. Evans) of the highly praised
Kaigun: Tactics and Technology in the
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941
(Naval Institute Press, 1997). Holder of
a doctorate in modern Japanese history
from Princeton University and author,
coauthor, or editor of seven other
works, Peattie brings unique qualifica-
tions to the daunting task.
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Sunburst’s meat lies in seven chapters
that discuss the early development of
Japanese naval aviation (1909–21), Jap-
anese naval aircraft and the tactics de-
veloped for their employment (1920–
36), the design and construction of Jap-
anese aircraft carriers and formulation
of doctrine for their employment
(1920–41), the Japanese aircraft indus-
try and the design and construction of
aircraft (1937–41), and Japanese naval
aviation, both land and carrier based
during the undeclared war with China
(1937–41). Paralleling the wartime ex-
perience is a chapter on the develop-
ment of Japanese naval air power in
projecting the empire’s power as it pre-
pared for the Pacific conflict. The final
chapter, “Descending the Flame,” be-
gins with the attack on Pearl Harbor
and with the destruction, at sea and un-
der way, of the British battleship HMS
Prince of Wales and battle cruiser HMS
Repulse. It ends with the battle of the
Philippine Sea in June 1944, after which
“the Japanese Navy never again launched
a significant effort to contest the hege-
mony of the skies over the Pacific.”
Augmenting the text are nine appendi-
ces: biographical sketches of those men-
tioned in the text; a glossary of naval
aviation terms; the generic organization
of Japanese naval aviation; naval aviation
ships (carriers, seaplane carriers, and the
like); naval air bases and air groups; prin-
cipal naval aircraft; aircraft designation
systems; principal engines; and a descrip-
tion of the “turning-in” maneuver. A
common thread found in the graphics
that appears throughout the text is the
superb work of Jon Parschall, who ren-
ders tactical maneuvers, ordnance, air-
craft, and ships with equal facility.
Sunburst, which Peattie affectionately
dedicates to his former coauthor,
concludes that the “catastrophic col-
lapse” of Japanese naval air power lay in
the Imperial Navy’s failure “to antici-
pate the kind of air combat it would be
obliged to wage,” its failure “to make
the right kinds of decisions” to cope
with the realities of a “new kind of air
war,” and, importantly, “the inability of
Japanese industry and technology to
support Japanese naval aviation against
the emerging numerical and qualitative
superiority of American air power.” In
that connection, this reviewer was par-
ticularly pleased with how Peattie dis-
poses of the most common of persistent
Midway myths, that the battle resulted
in the catastrophic loss of aircrew.
While heavy, the loss of pilots and ob-
servers by no means equaled the loss of
the “trained maintenance personnel,”
invaluable to maintain modern naval
aircraft, who went down with their
ships. “Similarly,” he contends, “the
loss of skilled ground crews, often
abandoned to their fates when the navy
evacuated remaining aircrews from is-
lands under siege, substantially weak-
ened the land-based air groups.”
“In the end,” Peattie concludes, “the
Japanese naval air service was outpro-
duced, outorganized, outmanned, and
outfought.” Yet in the ashes of defeat,
however, “the precision, skill, and . . .
technical mastery” with which the Japa-
nese crafted the Zero fighter “gave wings
to the phoenix of postwar Japanese tech-
nology.” Students of the Pacific War will
find Sunburst (based on an impressive
array of Japanese sources, including the
official war history volumes and a variety
of book or article-length studies) invalu-
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